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PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN VIRGINIA
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY HEARINGS
RICHARD CROUCH
With the exception of certain felony cases transferable
to courts of record at the State's option,' all charges in-
volving juveniles in Virginia are heard in a special statu-
tory proceeding in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court.2 The proceedings are summary and civil,3 and the
vast majority of cases are carried on without ever coming
to a lawyer's attention.4 The occasional attorney who does
become involved, however, should know where both he and
his client stand in this anomalous process where often the
statute itself is of little help. Nor are the reports especially
useful: In a field where procedure so often escapes the
surveillance of adversary legal counsel, the dearth of case
law is understandable.
The officially civil character of the proceeding must be
borne in mind; especially since, understandably enough,
"in the rush to classify a delinquency case as a 'civil'
case, . . . some troublesome problems have been brushed
aside. ' 5 The fact that this alone provides a simple formula
for potential abuse should not 'blind us to the substantial
good that the innovation may accomplish. But some areas
of uncertainty remain, as they must whenever authorities
are given full criminal-court powers to affect liberty and
property by a process which is designated as other than
criminal.
I VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-175, 176, 176.1, 177 (1950) (Replace-
ment Volume 1960).
2 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-158 (Replacement Volume 1960).
3 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-179 forbids the use of words crime or con-
viction in referring to JDR court action. Jones v. Commonwealth,
185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d (1946) denominates the proceeding as defi-
nitely a civil, and non-criminal one.
4 Judge Hugh Reid, Jr. of Arlington County JDR Court estimates
number of hearings in which attorneys participate at 10 per cent
of the total.
5 Shears, Curtis, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48
A.B.A.J. 719 at 722.
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Due Process of Law
Most of the problems cluster around "due process," an
ancient but nonetheless elusive concept. Following a brief
general discussion of Due Process as Virginia Constitution-
al doctrine and in the delinquency field, some potentially
troublesome sections of the Virginia statute should be ex-
amined with regard to Due Process, essential fairness, and
practical reliability. Those points which have been the
subject of national disagreement or of appellate litigation
in Virginia, and others which dictate especial caution on
the part of counsel or litigant are noted. Likewise note-
worthy are unique concepts of statutory justice and at-
titudes of which parties and counsel should remain aware.
There are aspects of -this law which would seem to make a
certain degree of familiarization advisable for practically
anyone who is a parent. The over-all purpose here, how-
ever, is that the attorney may have some idea of what to
expect in litigation of this sort, and some basis for advise
to clients involved.
Nationally, where the question has reached litigation,
appellate court opinions upon the role of due process in
juvenile justice have been divergent.6 Some courts have
found constitutional orthodoxy a simple obligation, com-
pelled by elementary logic; others have found the concept
of juvenile rights nothing short of absurd. Many hold that
(1) the minor's only right is to custody and restraint, and
(2) the parents' right to supply it was forfeited by allow-
ing the child to come within the jurisdiction of the court.7
So far as the specific criminal-trail rights are concerned,
the unqualified negative implied in Pee v. United States
would seem to be a majority.8
In the opinions of the JDR courts themselves, the one
word best applicable to due process in this connection is
6 "There -is no unanimity of opinion among the various courts as to
whether or not constitutional guarantees are applicable to juvenile
offenders." In Re Poff, 135 F.S. 224 (U.S.D.C., D.C., 1955).
7 Wisconsin Industrial School v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651 at 654,
19 N.W. 422 at 427 (1899).
8 274 F.2d 556 (U.S.C.A., D.C., 1959) (See Appendix "A", p. 651,
Appendix "B", p. 653).
78 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEw
irreevant. If it were at all probable that no one is ever
deprived of life, liberty or property under these statutes,
then perhaps quite a good case might be made for "ir-
relevancy."
Whether or not due process is held to be applicable
here, it is obvious that the court's powers over life, liberty
and property in a juvenile proceeding can be substantial.
The court is empowered under § 16.1-158 to dictate "the
custody, support, control or disposition of a child." It may
transfer a child's case for conduct as an adult criminal trial.
Likewise it may simply apply within the juvenile court it-
self all the adult penalties. It can order summary or regular
insanity commitment, or whatever care it may choose. This
includes compulsory medical or psychiatric treatment for
child or adult at a parent's own expense, and unlimited
"watchful care, custody, discipline, supervision, guardian-
ship and control" by the court for the remainder of the
child's minority. The court will also assume an all-pervasive
dominion over family life and all its intimacies by a decree
of probation.9
Virginia's idea of civil due process is embodied in Con-
stitution § 11. So far as "all authorities agree," this in-
cludes notice and a hearing before an impartial tribunal
"before any decree can be passed affecting the rights to
liberty or property."' 0 Likewise held absolute are the right
against self-incrimination and the right to know the cause
and nature of one's accusation."
Life, Liberty and Property
It should become apparent that there are a great many
once-fondly regarded rights (Their status vel non as con-
stitutional liberties under § 11 is another matter.) which
are compromised, or more accurately, stultified, under
9 Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-176; 177.1; 178(6), (10); 140; 178(1),
(1950). (Replacement Volume 1960).
10 Ward Lumber Co. v. Henderson-White Mfg. Co., 107 Va. 626, 59
S.E. 476; Commission v. Hampton Roads Oyster Packers, etc.,
Ass'n., 109 Va. 565, 64 S.E. 1041.
11 Cullen v. Commonwealth, 24 Gratt. (65 Va.) 624; Litton v. Com-
monwealth, 101 Va. 833, 44 S.E. 923; Pine v. Commonwealth, 121
Va. 812, 93 S.E. 652.
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these provisions. Whatever civil or property right a parent
may be said to have in the custody of one's own children
would be included here.12 Insofar as any right exists not
to be subjeot to the degradation of -involuntary physical
and mental examination and clinical treatment, that too
would be included. That liberty which Justice Brandeis
characterizes -as "the most comprehensive of all rights and
the right most valued by civilized men"-i.e., a certain
modicum of domestic privacy, or "the right to be. let
alone,"'13 suffers most conspicuously here. Morever, it would
be eociologically unrealistic to assume that no stigma or
social detriment attaches -to a child or family as a result
of its experience with juvenile court 'therapy."
The matter of removal from parental custody cannot be
excluded from any discussion of life, liberty and property
interests. Some courts have found the logic compelling that
if, or even because, the juvenile has no rights, then the
parent does. Seen thus
..a parent or guardian of such child, is a party to the
proceedings under the statute to have the child declared
neglected, dependent or delinquent, in the sense that he
or she has the right to appear and give testimony, to
be represented by counsel, to call witnesses and to cross-
examine witnesses. 15
Other courts have so held because "the proceeding as a
whole is one which deals with important rights, the natural
right of parents to rear and educate their own child in
the parental home and the natural right of the child to
be so reared."'16 In this context it should be worth noting
12 Shioutakon v. Dist. of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (98 App. D.C. 371,
1956), 60 A.L.R.2d 689, cites "the court's power to deprive the
child of liberty and the parents of custody."
'3 Brandeis, J., (dissenting) Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 at 478,
72 L.Ed. 944 at 956 (1927). It should be noted that Brandeis here
was speaking of the right as constitutional: "They conferred-as
against the government-the right to be let alone .. ."
14 In Re Conteras, 109 Cal. App.2d 787 at 789, 241 P.2d 633 (D.C.
of App., 2d Dist., Div. 1, Calif. 1952).
15 In Re Aronson, 263 Wis. 604, 58 N.W.2d 553 (1953), 60 A.L.R.2d
693, n. 2.16 In Re Custody of a Minor, 250 F.2d 419 at 420 -(1957).
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that power over the citizen's child is in faot a great potential
power over the citizen.
So considered, the juvenile court process is worthy of a
measure of prudent respect and of more particularized con-
sider-ation. There follows a seotion-by-section examination
of those procedural formulae whereby any substantive
rights accruing are to be secured.
The Character of the Adjudication
The most problematical of the Standard Act provisions
in Virginia's statute are also those sections which are most
fundamental to the act itself. These are § 16.1-158 and 178,
the "jurisdictional" sections concerning the powers of the
court and the occasions for their exercise. It -is under these
laws that the court takes dominion over a family, -adult
or child. The object was to obviate the criminal connotations
and social stigma attaching to the finding of "delinquency,"
and to remove tradition-sanctioned -procedural impedimenta
based thereon. The device employed is the equation, or
merger, of the concepts of jurisdiction, culpability, and
liability to "disposition." In other words, it is by "coming
within the purview of this Law" that a minor is rendered
liable to the dispositional processes of the juvenile court.
He is then liable in the same sense that an adult found
guilty and convicted forfeits his freedom and becomes
subject to punishment. A few of the numerous ways in
which a minor "comes within the purview" are:
(1) being in any of the older statutory categories
("dependent, delinquent or neglected"),"'
(2) having "habits or practices injurious to his
welfare",
(3) being in need of medical "or any other care
necessary to his well being,"
(4) or, under § 16.1-158 (1) (j), being alleged to
be such as should be under the jurisdiction of the court.
17 VA CODE ANN. § 63-257 (1950) [Repealed].
[VOL. 5:76
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS, ETC.
This last mentioned subsection of '§ 16.1-158 is par-
ticularly worth noting. Under this clause it is obviously the
fact of allegation that is central to the finding of jurisdic-
tion. As Judge Mack would have it,
The problem for the determination of -the court is
not, Has this boy or girl committed a specific wrong,
but What is he, how has he become what he is, and
what had best be done in his interest and in the interest
of the state .... Is
Given such an allegation, there is of course no need for
any fact-finding procedure for objective assessment of the
allegation's truth or falsity. In fact, except in cases of
transfer to a court of record, there is no semblance of any
provision for one. 19 It was observed, in fact, by a Virginia
writer urging adoption of the merger provision 20 that:
.. this device has been criticised because "a court with-
out categories may engage in deciding that a child be-
fore it might benefit from the court facilities without
concerning itself with a clear 'legal test of jurisdiction
and proof. 21
However, just such an -approach is often the subject, not
of criticism, but of judicial pride---as is the case with Judge
Mack's statement above.
Despite the criminal law's voluminous provisions for the
protection of a possibly innocent defendant, the plight of
the mistakenly or falsely -accused juvenile is an intentional-
ly omitted case. This presumption-of-non-innocence ap-
proach, it seems, can be rationalized only upon one of sev-
eral blanket assumptions:
18 Mack, Julian W., The Juvenile Court, 23 Harvard L. Rev. 104,
119-20 (1909).
19 And here it is an inquiry into the child's entire personal and fam-
ily situation, -but is required to include the "circumstances" giv-
ing rise to the charge. Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-164, 214 (1950)
(Replacement Volume 1960).
20 Juvenile Delinquency in the J.D.R. Courts of Virginia, 36 Va. L.
Rev. 113, 129.
21 Ibid., quoting Rubin, The Legal Character of Juvenile Delinquen-
cy, 261 Annals 6 (1949).
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(1) the old-world rationale that any accusation, even
a false one, is in itself indicative of such social trouble,
unworthiness, or maladjustment that intervention and
"disposition" are justified-i.e., that we can categorical-
ly equate non-innocence with misfortune or un-
popularity;
(2) that absolutely no one would make an ill-found-
ed allegation;
(3) that no socially prejudicial or unenviable result
could possible proceed from probation, commitment,
hospitalization, or any of the other sancations at the
disposal of the modern juvenile court.22
The body of opinion which calls itself the Juvenile Court
Movement prides itself upon being not legal but "sociolog-
ical." True sociological realism, however, would forbid re-
liance upon the unscientific presumption that no one is
going to bear false witness against his neighbor, particular-
ly when protected by the anonymity which hearsay and ex-
parte procedure afford. The ultimate wisdom of the decision
to embody such sociological naivete in our statutory law-
particularly as the law is such a powerful one 2 3 -has not
remained unquestioned. 24 Some propositions have been ad-
22 "In many instances it is apparent that a child is regarded as a
delinquent merely because he has been brought before the juve-
nile court. Such a psychological approach appears dangerous,
especially when the alleged acts of delinquency would be a crime
if committed by an adult." Annot.: 43 A.L.R.2d 1130.
23 As to this aspec of the law, Roscoe Pound's observation seems
particularly apropos: "The powers of the Star Chamber were a
trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile courts and courts
of domestic relations. It is well known that too often the placing
of a child in a home or even in an institution is done casually or
perfunctorily or even arbitrarily. Even with the most superior
personnel, these tribunals call for legal checks." Foreword to
SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUEN-
CY, by Pauline V. Young (1952).
24 "Nevertheless, the promoters of this legislation in their enthusiasm
.have gone to the borderline of prudence.., the orthodox rules
of evidence have been riddled as with a machinegun. The hear-
say reports of probation officers and others can be used without
calling them to be examined ... The party may be subject to a
physical and mental examination . . . the child may be compelled
to answer to his own crimes, past and present." 5 Wigmore, Evi-
dence, 3d ed. § 1400.
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vanced which at least are not so replete with tacit as-
sumptions.
An Alternative to Merger
Determination-disposition merger is an attempted
remedy which has itself given rise to a host of problems.
The most obvious of solutions to this is of course dichotomy
-a clear separation of the determinative and dispositional
functions.25 Admittedly, this may be too facile a solution,
notwithstanding it has been the accepted method in all
other Anglo-American courts for several centuries. The
patent simplicity of this answer has not prevented its gain-
ing widespread currency, however.26 It has done so even
in jurisdictions where express appellate-court rejection of
due process notions leaves the judge under no legal obliga-
tion to countenance them. In Virginia, an example is the
avowed policy of Arlington County's JDR Court:
Officially at least, this policy prescribes an initial hear-
ing focused exclusively upon the fact-issue of grounds for
"jurisdiction. 2 7 As recommended by several authorities,
the judge preserves objectivity by avoiding all consultation
of the social casework report until dispositional jurisdiction
is assumed. 28 This of course accords with the procedure for
courts of record under § 16.1-161. It reflects, at least in
this initial hearing, the -legalistic view that "Hearsay,
opinion, gossip.. .and fears of social workers. . .have no
25 This proposal is embodied in the American Legal Institute's Model
Youth Correction Authority Act. See GELLHORN, CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY,
(New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1954) p. 92. The underlying ra-
tionale is set forth at pp. 94-95: "F6w persons favor an omni-
present and authoritative judicial agency that would intrude into
the family whenever it thought that a child needed guidance. Pre-
vention and rehabilitation... must not become excuses for judi-
cial carelessness concerning whether there is a true basis for of-
ficial intervention. The justification for intervention should be
determined in a clear cut way before there is any effort to plan
the details."
26 Ibid.
27 Arlington County, Virginia, Juvenile and Domestic Relations
County Court, ANNUAL REPORT (1961) 6.
28 Data supplied by Honorable Hugh Reid, Jr., Judge of Arlington
J.D.R. Court. U.S. Children's Bureau, Standards for Specialized
Courts Dealing with Children (1954), 53, recommends this pro-
cedure.
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more place in Children's courts than in any other court.
'29
Actually, observation of this formality causes the court
little additional expense or inconvenience. Factual suf-
ficiency, after all, is not a difficult condition to satisfy in
view of the comprehensive character of statutory "pur-
view."
Rules of Procedure
As already stated, the juvenile court process is an
anomalous one. A distinctive peculiarity of the delinquency
hearing among Virginia court, procedures is that under
§ 16.1-154 of the statute each judge formulates his own
procedural rules, "not in violation of law." In this situation
the requirement of a period of legal experience (as suggest-
ed in the Standard Juvenile Court Act) might be a com-
mendable addition to the statute.
30
Juvenile Cases as Civil Proceedings
It should be noted that before the adoption of Virginia's
present act, there existed a considerable body of case law,
the significance of which § 16.1-158 was meant to eliminate.
These precedents indicated that a finding of delinquency
is in effect a finding of criminality. The term delinquency,
it was said, "implies a statutory violation of the penal
code," 3' 1 and "is a serious reflection of [the child's]
character and habits. '32 Hence the term "should not include
behavior other than that which indicates criminal ten-
dencies, ' 33 and should not include mere ordinance violations,
29 People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171 at 178 (1932). Accord: GUIDES
FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, supra, note 17, p. 61; In Re
Mont., 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954); In Re Brown,
201 S.W.2d 844 (1947); Harry v. State, 246 Wis. 69, 16 N.W.
390 (1944). Perhaps the most emphatic expression of the view-
point, however, is offered -by Justice Musmano, dissenting, In Re
Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 614; 109 A.2d 523, 530 (1954). He cites this
as an "amazing paradox in jurisprudence."
30 A minimum of six years legal experience, Juvenile Court Stand-
a rd, U.S. Children's Bureau Publication No. 121 (1923), p. 2.
ee also, GUIDES FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, (New
York National Probation and Parole Ass'n., 1957) 124.
31 36 Va. L. Rev. 113, 128.
32 Jones v. Commonwealth, supra, note 8, at 341; 88 S.E.2d at 447.
8S See, 86 Va. -L. Rev. 113 at 130.
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pranks or mala prohibita.34 Most importantly, the finding
required, as does a conviction, some measure of procedural
fairness in arriving at it. 3 5 Moreover, (quite aside from
any equation of delinquency with crime) the Supreme ,Court
of Appeals had arrived at several definitive holdings as to
what evidence would support a delinquency finding.36 Such
reasoning led inevitably to the rule, so familiar to adult
law, that upon a finding of innocence the court should
dismiss. 37
The newer Code's rejection of the criminal connotations
which provided the theoretical basis for the above quoted
phrases, is explicit: The "jurisdictional" ruling of § 16.1-158
replaces the finding of delinquency; § 16.1-179 in no un-
certain terms decrees:
. .nor shall any child be denominated a criminal by
reason of any such adjudication, nor shall such ad-
judication be denominated a conviction.
It may still be asked, however, whether merely purging
the law of evil terminology has worked the expected
miracles.38 For one thing, the judicial objections to com-
prehensive vagueness in the old "delinquency" statute were
diverse: not all of them went to this one matter of reputa-
tional detriment (and here is where the "jurisdictional"
panacea was to do so much substantial good). On the con-
trary, many of these objections focused upon a far more
concrete aspect of the finding's practical effect, and one
34 Jones v. Commonwealth, supra, note 3, at 43; 38 S.E.2d at 447.
Here, in fact, the cour.t noted that a decree of probation on such
grounds was "offensive to our sense of justice and to the intend-
ment of the law." 343.
35 Jones v. Commonwealth, supra, note 3. Ex Parte Smith, 124 Va.
791, 98 S.E. 10; Ex Parte Mallory, 122 Va. 298, 94 S.E. 782.
36 See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, supra, note 3.
37 Mickens v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 273, 16 S.E.2d 641, cert. den.,
314 U.S. 690, 62 S.Ct. 362, 86 L.Ed. 552, reh. den., 314 U.S. 717,
62 S.Ct. 484, 86 L.Ed. 570. Accord, National Probation and Parole
Association, GUIDES FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, 61.
38 For a full exposition of the theory that to deny right to counsel
and other procedural safeguards on the basis of this "non-crimi-
nal" theory "is to allow legal fictions and semantic manipulations
to overcome reason and common sense," see 45 Ky. L.J. 532, cited
in 63 A.L.R.2d 697, n. 13.
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which is still very much with us. That is, the very real
consequence, not of the finding itself upon reputation, but
of the sentence rendered thereunder upon liberty and
property. 9 Here, of course, it makes little practical dif-
ference that there has been a change of the words designat-
ing the finding upon which the sentence was based.
From the standpoint of constitutional awkwardness, this
point may be crucial: the objecting justices were inferring
criminal law aspects of the old statute from something
which remains unchanged under the present one-i.e., its
direct effect upon liberty and property in the more tradi-
tional sense. Here difficulties appear, for "It is only be-
cause the courts have interpreted the juvenile court acts
as non-criminal that they have almost unanimously upheld
their constitutionality." 40
Indeed, it may even be asked whether semantic exorcism
in this area of intended benefit-community stigma-has
had so wholesome an effect as to justify itself. Even ignor-
ing the holding In Re Conteras4 ' that it is "common knowl-
edge that such an adjudication ". . .is a blight upon the
character and a serious impediment to the future of a
minor," one may still be compelled to note that "regardless
of attempts to get rid of this idea, a serious stigma attaches
to being considered a case for court treatment, that these
devices seriously resrict the freedom the child needs for
his personal growth."
42
At any rate, it seems that the recent solicitous attention
given to terminology has only increased the degree of com-
placent self-righteousness in our attitude toward the prob-
lems of the most defenseless of social interest groups, and
has decreased proportionately (for better or for worse)
any natural reluctance to commit misbehaving children to
the processes of the law.
39 See, Jones v. Commonwealth, supra, note 3.
40 SUSSMAN, FREDERICK B., JUVENILE DELINQUENCY,
Rev.2d ed. (New York, Oceana, 1959) 36.
41 Supra, note 14.
42 Sussman, supra, note 40, p. 30, n. 3.
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The Requirement of Certainty
From the standpoint of the would-be law abiding child
or parent, the broad new definition of juvenile "trouble"
(§ 16.1-158) goes a long way toward making trouble some-
thing rather impossible to stay out of. In fact, in one survey
of college men and women, the average number of common
statutory juvenile "offenses"" committed during minority
was ten per student. 43 It is at least inferable that the
doctrine of certainty which has evolved in the interpretation
of Virginia's constitutional due process and law of the land
clauses, was aimed at statutes such as this one. Concerning
adult offenders, at least, the requirement is that:
An act creating a statutory offense, to be valid, must
specify with reasonable certainty and definiteness the
conduct which is condemned or prohibited, that is, what
must -be done or avoided, so that a person of ordinary
intelligence may know what is thereby required of him.44
Even a tacit assurance that the statute would not be literally
enforced would not be a satisfactory answer here. To the
explicit constitutional objection the only immediately ap-
parent answer would seem to be as follows: That the benign
therapy of the modern juvenile court process is so bene-
ficial that no child or parent would want to avoid it.
Any conscientious examination of the certainty problem
necessarily brings up a related difficulty. One important
basis for the criticism of any law is its long range effect.
In this field the effect of psychological impressions is held
to be of vital relevance. But a sociological consideration here
is the image the law presents to young persons who may
become involved. It is doubtful that a child will respect a
43 PORTERFIELD, YOUTH IN TROUBLE, (1946) 38-45. How-
ever, these were the enumerated offenses found in nearly all de-
linquency statutes. It should be remembered that Virginia's sta-
tute contains in addition two "offenses" with which this survey
was not concerned: (1) the codified misprision of § 16.1-158(1)(f), and (2) the "purview" provision of § 16.1-158(1) (j), where-
by a minor may become involved with the law while pursuing the
most scrupulous course of passive innocence.
44 Peacock v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 464, 106 S.E.2d 659; Caldwell
v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 454, 94 S.E.2d 537.
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system of law whereby he is convinced that to be apprehend-
ed is itself a crime.45 This easy inference leads directly to
its natural converse-the cynic philosophy of the criminal
classes, that the only crime is to get caught.46 The statute
as it stands simply does not convey to the child the image
of consistent fairness which otherwise characterizes the
law. The Law holds itself scrupulously to this dignified
standard on other occasions-even when dealing with those
who have themselves broken the rules. Yet here it gives way
to a rather ignoble image-that of an officious neighbor
motivated by prurient, morbid curiosity. This effect is par-
ticularly regrettable in regard to preventive and rehabilita-
tive schemes; for these must be based upon a respect for
law, and for the society of which the law is a reflection.
Also relevant from the standpoint of certainty is the
lingering jurisdiction of the JDR court in its role as a
court of equity. Generally, certainty is a concept so vital to,
if not synonumous with, Anglo-American law, that it is
accorded as a right even to those who have been convicted.
The juvenile coming within the law's "purview", however,
shall be for his or her minority subject to such
watchful care... and controls as may be conducive to
the welfare of the child and the best interests of the
State.48
The West Virginia Supreme Court in observing a similar
grant of power, felt that it calls for a certain measure of
judicial clarification. They observe:
The "continuing jurisdiction" provision of 44-5-2,
gives the court no unusual or additional power. It simply
gives the trial court the authority to 'reopen' the matter
and changes the status of the infant if the parties are ac-
45 Supra, note 23.
46 Or more politely phrased, "This would seem to suggest that
whether or not one is officially delinquent depends not on his
conduct alone, ,but to a great extent on the referral practices
which obtain in his community." Sussman, supra, note 40, 23.
47 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-140 (1950) (Replacement Volume 1960).
48 Ibid.
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corded due process of law and the evidence warrants
such action. 49
Even aside from the matter of historical equity jurisdiction,
the wisdom of a provision that "all commitments under this
law shall be for an indeterminate period"50 is open to
question on certainty grounds.
Specially Authorized Informal Procedures
Section 16.1-164 places certain qualifications upon the
private rights which would have survived under other
sections. Assuming arguendo that a finding of "jurisdic-
tion" (§ 16.1-158) can support a forfeiture of rights by
child or parent, it should be noted that forfeiture does not
begin here--at least so far as domestic privacy is concerned.
Under § 16.1-164, whenever the judge
receives reliable information that any child or minor
is within the purview of this law or subject to this
jurisdiction. . .the court shall require an investigation
which may include the physical, mental and social con-
ditions and the personality of the child or minor...
The court may then "proceed informally and make such
adjustment as is practical without a petition." In this in-
stance a police or probation officer is required to file a
petition whenever no one else will. Wherever the bounds
of proper informal adjustment may lie, this is judicial
discretion at its broadest.
No doubt this provision is a beneficial one, insofar as it
may facilitate settlement or dismissal of petty neighborhood
and domestic problems without exercise of the court's
specific sanctions. Yet so all-pervasive an investigation pro-
cedure is itself a substantial exercise of dominion. Normally,
only convicted criminals are subjected to it. The truly pre-
judicial result obtains when the judge consults the in-
vestigative report (which is obtained before notice or hear-
49 Matter of Underwood, 144 W.Va. 312 at 327, 107 S.E.2d 608 at
616, 617.
50 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-180 (1950) (Replacement Volume 1960).
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ing) in, or prior to, adjudicating "jurisdiction".51 This he
may do under the present statute, although some judges
eschew the procedure, as noted above. This questionable
method is expressly endorsed by some authorities. 52 On the
other hand, it has been the basis of reversal in several juris-
dictions. 53 The National Probation and Parole Association
not only counsels against it, but extends its caveat even
to the' activities of the investigating officer: The Associa-
tion recommends an immediate suspension of social inquiry
upon denial of the charge.54
Public-Private Character of the Hearing
Section 16.1-162, as yet unlitigated at the appellate level,
deals with circumstances of the hearing. The difficiulties
inherent in similar provisions have occasioned serious con-
cern in other quarters. The ex-parte form, for example, can
be invoked at any time, in the absolute discretion of the
judge. Dean Wigmore cites this as the one feature of de-
linquency statutes which -is the most "clearly over the
borderline of prudence." 55 He urges:
But that the trial judge should have the power to
commit to long detention any person without giving
the person any opportunity to hear the substance of the
testimony against him, is fundamentally unsound and
practically dangerous. That provision should be purged
from the statutes, and no judge in practice should allow
himself to employ it.56
On the other hand, it is contended by many authorities
that the child's psychological equilibrium (which is to bene-
51 In a New York survey, over half the judges answering a ques-
tionnaire admitted consulting background reports before the hear-
ing. Correct Use of Background Reports in Juvenile Delinquency
Cases, 5 Syracuse L. Rev. 67 (1953).
52 See, Gonas, John S., Therapy in the Juvenile Court, 48 A.B.A. J.
326, 327.
53 Ford v. State, 122 Ind. App. 315, 104 N.E.2d 406 (1952); In Re
Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d Z08 (1954). Annot: 43 A.L.R.
2d 1128, 1141-43 (1955).
54 GUIDES, supra, note 17, at 50. The Association has renamed it-
self, and is now the National Council on Crime and Delinquency.
55 5 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d Ed. § 1400.
56 Ibid.
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fit by involuntary examination, surveillance, commitment
or confinement) would be imperilled by the traumatic rigors
of any court proceeding-even an informal one.57
The real unfairness and inconvenience, however, would
seem to lie not so much in the ex-parte approach itself, as
in the peculiar discrimination against defendant parties:
The hearing is not a public trial, yet neither is it exactly a
privileged one. The judge may admit not only strangers to
whom the family's problems are a matter of scientific
curiosity, but anyone with a "proper interest therein." Yet
(expressly here) he may exclude child, parent and at-
torney.58 The sociological wisdom of adding insult to what-
ever injury may obtain in ex-parte procedure is debatable.
Requirements of Notice under § 16.1-172 and § 16.1-173
The notice provisions of the statute follow a familiar
pattern: They begin with seeming requirements of formal-
ity, but end in a convenient exception which is capable of
rather broad interpretation.59 Notice is one of the four
definite constitutional due process guarantees,60 and the
notice requirements for juvenile proceedings have indeed
occasioned litigation in Virginia. But the holding that literal
non-compliance, when it did occur, was fatal to jurisdiction,
arose under the older statutes.6 1 This compliance require-
ment under the new Code may be satisfied by a judicial
certification that "no useful purpose would be served" by
57 See generally Gonas, supra, note 52. In Re Santilles, 47 N.M. 140,
at 160, 138 P.2d 503 at 516 (1943).
58 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-195 (1950) (Replacement Volume 1960).
It must not be assumed that the "proper interest" is interpreted
in practice as "a legal interest" for the latter phrase was struck
in favor of the present provision by a 1958 Amendment. Appar-
ently, "a proper interest" would be such an interest as that of
the "representatives of various Arlington women's clubs" "invited
to sit in" on juvenile hearings in that county. (Annual Report,
supra, note 28 at 14).
59 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-166, 172 (1950) (Replacement Volume
1960).
60 Ward Lumber Co. v. Henderson-White Mfg. Co., supra, note 9;
Commission v. Hampton Roads Oyster Packers, etc., Ass'n. supra,
note 9.
61 Ex Parte Mallory, supra, note 35.
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the parent's presence.62 Thus § 16.1-172 does not create so
strong a right in the parent as one might otherwise suppose.
In the same sense, it should be understood that the
procedural formula (petition-investigation-disposition) of
§ 16.1-166 is by no means mandatory. The court may itself
initiate proceedings without petition under § 16.1-164, and
filing may be done by a probation officer after investiga-
tion. Therefore, no undue reliance should be placed upon the
former section in trying to ascertain what the court has
done, is doing, or will do in any particular case.
Section 16.1-167 is another statutory exception to the
notice requirement. It excludes from § 16.1-172's protection
children present in the court, regardless of the occasion
for their presence. This may not exactly square with the
constitutional notice requirements of § 11. Moreover, § 8's
protection against self-incrimination extends to "witnesses
in any investigation", civil or criminal.6 3 While the possi-
bilities of abuse in such a situation may not be immediately
apparent, they are graphically presented in the West Vir-
ginia case of State v. Ferrell.6 4 This is not a matter of ex-
press statutory endorsement in that state. Nevertheless it
is not entirely irrelevant that the West Virginia court look-
ed upon such procedure as something of an outrage, and a
violation of federal 14th Amendment requirements.
Application of Adult Penalties
There is express authorization under §§ 16.1-161, 175
and 176 for trial of older minors as adults in courts of
82 VA CODE ANN. § 16.1-172 (1950) (Replacement Volume 1960).
To be so certifiable the uselessness of parental attendance must
be the result of any of several conditions set forth in §. 16.1-166.
But these conditions are the appearance of "such conditions or
surroundings that his welfare requires or there is other good rea-
son" that custody be taken without regard to procedural formali-
ties.
63 Cullen v. Commonwealth, supra, note 11; Litton v. Commonwealth,
supra, note 10.
64 14-0 W.Va. 202, 83 S.E.2d 648. Here teen-ager called as witness
in trial of a rapist denied having been a rape victim, was then
questioned about her own sex life, admitted having relations on
one remote occasion with a serviceman whose name she would
not disclose, was thereupon sentenced summarily to reform school.
Parents' petition for jury trial and for custody denied. Reversed
by Supreme Court.
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record, and decisions under these sections tend to be more
scrupulously mindful of due process.65 Nevertheless, the
juvenile court may administer almost the full range of adult
penalties pursuant to its own civil and summary proceed-
ings, whenever it deems JDR Act measures not effectively
remedial.66 Commendable as disciplinary flexibility in itself
may be, it seems to introduce a disconcerning element of
unfairness. It is upon the child's immunity from the harsh-
ness of adult justice that his forfeiture of procedural safe-
guards is rationalized. The law is deprived of its essential
foundation of implied quid pro quo when that immunity is
itself removed. The position of some Federal courts has
been that the imposition of adult penalties will per se con-
vert the proceeding into a criminal one, and that full cus-
tomary due process is then required.6 7
A recent interpretation of the "effectively remedial"
clause construes here the necessity of a finding of "incor-
rigibility", supported by evidence, even though this word
does not appear -in the statute.68 This restrictive clarifica-
tion is commendable. But the incorrigibility finding itself
need not be reached by the orderly procedure which is
dictated by the severity of the sanctions which can be im-
posed. Therefore, it would seem that a disturbing inequity
remains, possibly to occasion future trouble.
Appeal Under § 16.1-214
Understandably this is a rare occurence in a field so
infrequently invaded by legal counsel. 69 Even so, the knowl-
05 Norwood v. City of Richmond, 203 Va. 886, 128 S.E.2d 425 (1962) ;
Durrette v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 735; Tilton v. Common-
wealth, 196 Va. 774, 85 S.E.2d 368; Green v. Commonwealth, 122
Va. 862, 94 S.E. 940; Ex Parte Mallory, supra, note 35.
66 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-177.1 (1950) (Replacement Volume
1960).
67 U.S. v. Hegstrom, 178 F.S. 17, at 20-21 (U.S.D.C. Conn., 1959),
holding further that: "To hold otherwise would be -to permit con-
finement for crime without a right to trial. This would be violat-
ing the constitutional right to due process under the Fifth Amend-
ment and the guarantee of fair trial of the Sixth Amendment."
See also, In Re Poff, supra, note 6.
68 Norwood v. -City of Richmond, supra, note 65.
69 Arlington's court, for example, making over 1600 juvenile "dis-
positions" annually, averages two appeals a year, and those are
"generally dilatory." Data supplied by Hon. Hugh Reid, Jr.,
Judge of Arlington County Juvenile -nd Domestic Relations Court.
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edge of a guaranteed right to appeal is a comfortable thing
-for attorney as well as for client.1 0
While appellate review is certainly not an element of
constitutional due process in Virginia,71 an ostensible right
to appeal is supplied. The succinct language of § 16.1-214
provides for review of "any final order affecting the rights
or interests" of the child or parent.1 2 However, several
qualifications on the practical significance of this little-used
right should be observed. The most obvious, of couse, is
that the awesome breadth of the juvenile judge's statutory
powers leaves little room for any meaningful definition of
abuse. As has been observed in the New York City courts:
Actions taken by -the juvenile judge are so much a
matter of discretion, and in areas where there are so
few norms, that in any event they would be immune
from appellate review. 3
But the truly ironic, if predictable, weakness is revealed by
the legislative history of such provisions, to wit: the
dominion exercisable over rights and interests without a
"final" order, can be substitutial. A New York study cites
as an example the finding in Re Herko, where a long, or
even indefinite, commitment to an insane asylum was held
not final. Hence it was not susceptible of appeal.74
Guardian Ad Litem and Legal Counsel
Section 16.1-172 and 173 do at least provide that the
child shall not be convicted or "purviewed" without the
presence at -the -hearing of some adult besides the judge.
The truly salutary effect of this step is rendered dubious,
70 36 Va. L. Rev. 120, n. 66: ...... While appeal from the decree of
a JDR court is rarely sought, it is a privilege which should be
readily available if needed."
71 McCue v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 870, 49 S.E. 623. Nor is it held
to be an absolute right in federal due process.
72 This is not a review in the most formal sense of the word, since
it is not the courtroom record of the juvenile proceeding (provid-
ed for in §§ 16.1-154, 162), but only the social background report,
which is sent up. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-214 (1950) (Replace-
ment Volume 1960).
73 Gellhorn, supra, note 26, at 81-82.
74 280 App. Div. 994, 117 N.Y. S.2d 43 (1952).
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however, by a notable exception: the statute allows the sub-
stitution of a probation officer as guardian ad litem in the
parents' absence.7 5 Here the proponents of the "sociological
approach" carry their rejection of -the adversary traditions
of Anglo-American jurisprudence to such an extreme as to
at least demonstrate their seriousness in the matter. 6 To
assume that a juvenile could not possibly have interests at
once adverse to both court and parents is one thing; the
facile assumption -that the interests of child, court, defend-
ant, parent, arresting and custodial personnel must neces-
sarily be coincident is obviously something else again. Re-
cently the Supreme Court of Appeals has even declared that
something else must be meant-that "the statutes do not
contemplate that in such cases the local Superintendent of
Public Welfare may represent both sides and be both plain-
tiff and defendant." 7 7 On several past occasions the Su-
preme Court of Appeals has held that a "judgment against"
an infant in the absence of a guardian ad litem is void, 8 and
recently they have recognized "compelling reasons against
relaxing that rule." 79 The relevance of such rulings is re-
stricted, however, by a theory which has not been rejected
explicitely-i.e., that a finding of "jurisdiction" cannot pos-
sibly be a "finding against" the child.80
75 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-173.
76 This is not to say that the same reasoning has not been carried
still further in other jurisdictions, at least as a matter of judicial
interpretation. The court in Re Custody of a Minor, supra, note
16, held that no decision regarding right to separate independent
counsel was necessary, "since the juvenile court process in effect
makes the Director of Social Work who initiates the proceedings,
the child's counsel." (Emphasis added.)
77 Lowe v. Grasty, 203 Va. 168, 173, 122 S.E.2d 967, 871.
78 Kanter v. Holland, 154 Va: 1.20, 152 S.E. 328; Broyhill v. Dawson,
168 Va. 321, 191 S.E. 779.
79 Lowe v. Grasty, supra, note 71. Cole v. Pennell, 2 Rand. (23 Va.)
174, contains a slightly broader and more careful statement of
the rule whereby -this precaution in favor of the minor's rights is
made mandatory: Here it was held "that an infant cannot be
prejudiced by any judicial proceedings, unless -he be defended by
guardian, a rule without which infants, incapable of protecting
themselves, might be utterly ruined, under color of judicial pro-
ceedings."
80 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-140: " ... It is the intention of this law
that... the court shall proceed upon the theory that the welfare
of the child is the -paramount concern of the state .. ." See also,
§ 16.1-179, which declares that the court's action must not be de-
nominated a criminal conviction, and for a typical statement of a
widely held view, see In Re Custody of a Minor, supra, note 16,
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There is in the Virginia statute no positive provision
for actual legal counsel (i.e., a practicing attorney) or for
information as to right thereto. But this is not because of
any national uniformity of appellate-court opinion on this
point. The vehement conflict over right to counsel has in
some states forced a searching reexamination of the whole
due process area of this field. In fact, it has raised serious
questions reaching the very fundamentals of juvenile court
law. Even in a Federal Constitutional context, "diametrical-
ly opposed and contrasting theories" 81 of constitutional
liberty are as yet unreconciled. One extreme is represented
in Ex Parte McDermott, a California case, wherein it was
held that:
.. there being no accusation of the commission of any
criminal offense, no legal rights of the ward in this
connection could be violated or abridged, and .. .there
was neither necessity nor occasion for the advice of
an attorney in relation thereto. 82
The qualified application of the anti-counsel theory stated
in the less dogmatic language of People v. Dotson, has also
achieved some currency. Hereunder a juvenile:
... is held to be deprived of due process only when the
lack of counsel is found to have actually resulted in
unfair treatment. 3
On the other hand, certain courts have rejected such
logic as resulting in "a denial of due process so gross as
to make the judgment lack a -necessary attribute of judicial
determination." This was the holding of State Department
of Public Welfare v. Barlow, a 1956 Arizona decision. 84 It
holding that "it must be remembered that this is not a criminal
proceeding, nor indicative of any kind of procedure against the
child."
Si RICHARD MILLS, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY-Also a Fed-
eral Problem, 49 A.B.A.J. 44, 47 (1963). -ee also, Paul W. Alex-
ander, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 46 A.B.A.J. 1206
(1960).
82 77 Cal. App. 109, 246 P. 28, 63 A.L.R.2d 699.
83 46 Cal.2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956), 60 A.L.R.2d 700.
84 80 Ariz. 249, 296 P.2d 298 (1956), 63 A.L.R.2d 692, n. 2.
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seems to represent fairly well the views of several similarly
unorthodox jurisdictions. 85
This is not the ultimate -in profound doctrinal deviation,
however: the earlier District of Columbia case of Evans v.
Rives had gone so far as to maintain that the social con-
siderations underlying the Juvenile Court Acts and the
informality permitted thereunder "are not and cannot be
incompatible with according an accused his constitutional
rights, of which counsel is one and ... cannot be ignored." 86
These occasional reconsiderations of juvenile court philoso-
phy seem to have culminated -in the neolegalistic heresies of
Conteras cited above, and Shioutakon v. D. C., where it is
declared:
The "right to be heard" when personal liberty is
at stake requires the effective assistance of counsel in a
juvenile court as much as it does in a criminal court...
the juvenile must be advised that he has the right to
engage counsel or to have counsel . . . in his behalf.87
Of course an interpretation necessitating (after the
manner of Shioutakon) court-appointed counsel would raise
almost insuperable budgetary objections. In the larger Vir-
ginia jurisdictions, 8 after all, the court "jurisdictionalizes"
over 1600 minors a year. 89 Nevertheless the suggestion con-
cerning a requirement for information of right to counsel
must give us pause:
The Shioutakon case also holds-and perhaps more im-
portantly from Virginia's viewpoint-that procedural rights
(such as they are) afforded by the juvenile court statute
85 See Shioutakun v. D.C., supra, note 12; In Re Poff, supra, note 6;
In Re Conteras, supra, note 14; People v. Willis, 343 Ill. App.
463, 99 N.E.2d 390; Ex Parte Brooks, 85 Tex. Crim. 252, 211
S.W. 592.86 75 App. D.C. 242; 126 F.2d 633 (1942); 63 A.L.R.2d.
87 Supra, note 12. In Re Poff, supra, note 6 (another District of
Columbia ruling, with which Shioutakon stands unreconciled at
date) makes very unequivocal declarations as to full constitu-
tional rights in minors, yet would restrict the right-to-counsel re-
quirement to situations where the juvenile is accused of what in
an adult would be a crime.
88 Arlington's Judge Reid estimates that the cost of these services
on a single busy day might run into four figures.
89 ANNUAL REPORT, supra, note 28, at 7, Table IV.
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are quite meaningless without legal assistance.9 0 Persuasive
here was the inherent absurdity in expecting a child to
fathom the complexities of the statute.91 This should bring
to mind the logic of the Virginia Mallory ruling,92 and the
far more recent Lowe case,93 holding certain of the statutory
rights to be mandatory, and hence to inure to the benefit
of any minor or parent who is aware enough to grasp them,
as a matter of right.
The categorical assumption that lawyers are neither
wanted nor needed in the delinquency matters is not an un-
assailable one. In the light of the several decisions, and
especially in view of the position taken by the National
Probation and Parole Association on this matter, 94 this
should be obvious. One social agency's investigator in fact
has observed:
. . I have questioned numerous parents... and have
yet to find one who would not want to have legal advice
if his child were in conflict with the law and subject
to the processes of an institution such as the juvenile
court today.95
Such findings as this would lend support even to the posi-
tion of the practitioner who ventures the suggestion that:
. . .The argument that lawyers are not ordinarily
conditioned by adversary proceedings to be helpful in
juvenile cases is not a convincing reason against assign-
ing them to a delinquency case."
Jurisprudential Considerations-Concluding Subjective
Postscript
Delinquency statistics reflect apprehensions. Thus the
one thing that the increasing figures definitely can be said
to mean is that more young offenders are being caught. Now
90 Supra, note 12.
9' Ibid.
92 Supra, note 35.
93 Supra, note 71.
94 GUIDFS, supra, note 17.
95 Letter by Bertram M. Beck, Director of the Special Juvenile De-
linquency Project of the Children's Bureau, July 31, 1953, quoted
in Gellhorn, supra, note 26, at 78 (N).
96 Shears, supra, note 5, at 723.
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what that in turn may mean is a matter of conjecture. The
inference that it reflects merely increased efficiency; or
perhaps only ubiquitous proliferation, of apprehension and
"referral" facilities is surely as logical an inference as any
other at this point. Whether or -not some other and more
remote conclusion lies-such as the popular notion that
there is something evil abroad in the land, which is subtly
turning our children to crime-is surely no less conjectural.
Certainly there are going to be impressively rising de-
linquency figues so long as delinquency's definition is the
one which is codified in Virginia at present-the one under
which our referral-disposition -systems now proceed.
Considerations of freedom and justice are not entirely
out of place here; another fundamental object of law, how-
ever, is perhaps even more immediately in point. That is
the diminution of petty litigation. This concept of the law
as a last resort is no new idea: it has been one of the
overall guiding principles of Anglo-American law, and his-
torically it has been found to work out rather well. There
was something-granted, not everything-to be said for
the older legal system where a man had to be sure enough,
serious enough, and incensed enough, to go through all the
awesome formalities necessary to sue his neighbor at the
law. At the very least, he had to be willing then to incur
the possible displeasure of those who were the deserving or
undeserving victims of his decision.
At present however, all it takes is an anonymous word
or. phone call to bring the awe-inspiring weight of the law
down upon a hapless family's head and the social services
into its bedrooms. And furthermore the anonymous traducer
may self-righteously arrogate to himself the comfortable
and flattering rationalization that he has exposed his fellow
man to processes which are only humanitarian. In sum, the
effect of the present law does not stop at a convenient
codification of misprision. Its true effect is to lend the
swift and terrible sanction of law to vindicative neighbor-
hood pettiness. De minimis curat lex.
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That such transcendent considerations are not entirely
beyond the pale of judicial concern is indicated by an ob-
servation of Justice Brandeis:
Triviality destroys at once both robustness of thought
and delicacy of feeling. No enthusiasm can flourish, no
generous impulse can survive under its blighting in-
fluence. 97
As for concerns of right and justice, it is difficult to
forbear suggestion that the anxieties voiced by extra-Vir-
ginia courts in this area should not be so blithely ignored.
It must be remembered that the context is a unique one: In
a normal situation, where appeal brings these matters be-
fore the high court and the legislature, we could assume
from the dearth of appeals alone that our courts were just--
but here we cannot.
97 GOLDMAN, SOLOMON, editor. THE WORDS OF JUSTICE
BRANDEIS. (New York, 1953) 172.
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